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Linda Kerber once observed, “Historians who inquire into the consequences of 
power seldom come up cheerful.”1  I will endeavor in this paper to prove her wrong, but 
the effort to do so may be painful to watch.  
In the western hemisphere, the consequences of the power exerted by the 
government of the United States have been plainly visible for more than a century. The 
United States made itself the dominant power, first in the Caribbean Basin and then, 
after World War One, throughout most of South America. The reality of this dominance, 
and the avid pursuit of it by US administrations as different as those of McKinley and 
Wilson, no longer occasion much debate. Nor does the logic that seems to have driven it. 
“For nearly two centuries,” Lars Schoultz concluded in his recent survey, “three interests 
have determined the content of United States policy toward Latin America: the need to 
protect U.S. security, the desire to accommodate the demands of U.S. domestic politics, 
and the drive to promote U.S. economic development.”2  
                                                 
1 In “Portraying an ‘Unexceptional’ American History,” Chronicle of Higher Education (July 
5, 2002), p. B14. 
2 Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America 
(Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 367. 
 
Unfortunately, the security of the United States, the political interests of its 
elected officials, and the health of its economy (or any of its large corporations) cannot 
be pursued simultaneously in anything like a coherent manner. Since the United States 
has not had to confront sustained competition from other Great Powers in the region for 
more than a century, it has not experienced much difficulty in maintaining its dominant 
position despite notable policy failures. This combination of incoherence and low risk 
helps to explain why U.S. policy has so often seemed inexplicably erratic or senselessly 
destructive. In effect, the Big Stick has been wielded in a way that resembles what the 
late nineteenth-century Mexican philosopher and educator Justo Sierra once called “that 
‘marvelous collective animal’ whose “enormous intestine” has insufficient 
nourishment”3  -- a great untamed beast with few natural enemies near enough to 
constrain it.  
Realists, as certain scholars and practitioners of international relations have 
styled themselves, would find nothing surprising in this story. Superpowers tend to 
dominate their smaller neighbors, who have little choice but to join the bandwagon and 
hope for the best. Relative might drives the system. Historians need not waste their time 
in the archives looking up what U.S. officials said to explain their actions. Structure 
trumps ethnography – all the rest is noise. Ideology, including Liberalism, is just part of 
the noise.  
This paper will look at one significant dimension of U.S. relations with Latin 
America in the twentieth century, that is, the history of successful efforts by the 
government of the United States to secure the overthrow, almost always by violent 
                                                 
3 Cited in Charles Hale, The Transformation of Liberalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Mexico 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 33. 
 
means, of Latin American governments that displeased it. The paper will argue that 
neither security nor economic interest helps much to explain either why the United 
States government was displeased or why it took its displeasure to such lengths. That 
leaves politics, where the waters are inevitably muddled by the interaction of rhetoric, 
culture, and mass psychology. Smart politics for the politician does not necessarily lead 
to rational choices for the body politic. Since it does not appear possible to explain US 
intervention in Latin America by means of conventional social scientific analysis, this 
paper leaves causal speculation to experts in cultural studies, the psychology of 
decision-making, and the contingencies of political calculation. 
 We begin with some data on the dependent variable. 
 
II 
Between 1898 and 1994, the U.S. government managed to secure the overthrow 
of 41 governments among our sister republics in Latin America, an average of one 
successful intervention every 28 months for an entire century (see Table 1). Direct 
intervention involving the use of U.S. military forces, intelligence agents, or local citizens 
employed by U.S. government agencies occurred in 17 of the 41 cases. In another 24 
cases, the U.S. government intervention was indirect. That is, local actors (usually 
military leaders) played the principal roles, but either would not have acted or would 
not have succeeded without encouragement or help from the U.S. government and its 
agents.  
While direct interventions are easily identified and copiously documented, 
identifying indirect interventions requires an exercise in historical judgment. The list of 
41 includes only cases where in my judgment the incumbent government would likely 
 
have survived in the absence of U.S. hostility. The list ranges from obvious cases to close 
calls. An example of an obvious case is the decision, made in the Oval Office in January 
1963, to incite the Guatemalan army to overthrow the (dubiously) elected government of 
Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes in order to prevent an open competitive election that might 
have been won by former President Juan José Arévalo.4 A somewhat less obvious case is 
that of the Chilean military coup against the government of President Salvador Allende 
Gossens on September 11, 1973. The Allende government had plenty of domestic 
opponents eager to see it deposed. It is included in this list because absent the 
unremitting hostility of the U.S. government, the Allende administration would almost 
certainly have managed to continue in office until the next presidential elections.5  
The 41 cases do not include incidents in which the United States sought to 
depose a Latin American government, but failed in the attempt. The most famous such 
case was the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961.6 Also absent from the list are 
numerous cases in which the U.S. government acted decisively to forestall a coup d’etat, 
as in December 1965, when the U.S. ambassador in Guatemala was instructed to 
“convey a strong warning against a coup” to the leader of a group plotting a coup 
                                                 
4 The coup led by Defense Minister Colonel Enrique Peralta took place on March 31, 1963. 
Arévalo, who had entered the country only days before, managed to flee back across the border. 
The Miami Herald published an interesting account of the Oval Office decision to overthrow 
Ydígoras written by Georgie Anne Geyer on December 24, 1966, pp. 12-A. 
5 The best account is in Peter Kornbluh’s introduction to the documents published in The 
Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability: A National Security Archive Book 
(New York: The New Press, 2003),  
6  See James G. Blight and Peter Kornbluh, eds., Politics of Illusion: the Bay of Pigs Invasion 
Reexamined (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.1998). 
 
against the military regime that had seized power two years earlier at Washington’s 
request.7    
The most difficult to judge are the cases like the 1966 military coup in Argentina, 
In this case, U.S. officials were opposed to the coup eventually led by Lieutenant 
General Juan Carlos Onganía, but refrained from communicating U.S. opposition to the 
plotters on the advice of U.S. Ambassador Edwin M. Martin, who observed that “the 
military have convinced themselves that in removing the Ilia government they would be 
fulfilling basically [the] identical role in Argentina that [the] armed forces performed in 
Brazil in ousting Goulart…They have followed closely US aid to Brazil since Goulart[‘s] 
departure and [the] press here has publicized, perhaps excessively, [the] enthusiasm of 
US investors for [the] new regime in Brazil.”8 The reaction of the U.S. government to the 
coup on June 28 took roughly the shape that the military expected. Recognition was 
extended on July 14 and both economic and military aid resumed shortly thereafter. I 
have excluded such cases from the list of 41, even though they demonstrate clearly how 
the U.S. embrace of one military regime (in Brazil in 1964) led military officials in other 
countries discount U.S. opposition to their plotting as merely “pro forma,” a view that 
was almost always accurate.  
The list in Table 1 also excludes cases in which the U.S. government managed to 
play a decisive role in overturning a government by means of “majestic inactivity” in the 
                                                 
7 See the account in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-
68, vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
2004), pp. 201-05 (hereafter cited as FRUS, followed by date). The U.S. knew the name of the coup 
plotter and the date he intended to move (December 20, 1965, postponed to December 22, and 
then abandoned). The instructions to the U.S. ambassador to head it off were sent on December 
17. Instructions were also sent to the U.S. ambassador in Nicaragua, who cautioned President 
Anastasio Somoza against giving further encouragement to the plotters in Guatemala. He was 
also asked to stop his efforts to foment a coup in Costa Rica as well. 
8 Ibid., p. 302. 
 
face of predictable outcomes. This exclusion is due to the multiple difficulties that attend 
the specification of appropriate counterfactuals. Suppose, for example, that the U.S. 
ambassador in Guatemala had not been instructed on December 17, 1965 to convey the 
strong disapproval of his government to the officers plotting a coup against the military 
dictator the U.S. had encouraged to take power only 18 months earlier? U.S. inactivity 
might then have proved decisive in the securing the collapse of the Peralta government. 
Would we be justified in including such cases in our list, absent any evidence of overt 
hostility toward the incumbent government?  
Many cases are even murkier, as the past decade of Latin American coups, near 
coups, sanitized coups, and failed coups shows. Except for the ouster of President 
Aristide in Haiti in 2004, the United States has not given an explicit green light for a 
coup d’etat in Latin America since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. But the 
United States has failed to provide modest amounts of aid in timely fashion (Ecuador, 
Bolivia), provided overt and covert aid to opposition groups seeking the ouster of an 
elected incumbent (Venezuela), and helped unconstitutional regimes to make 
themselves respectable (Ecuador and, briefly, Venezuela). Sometimes, that is, the red 
lights shine so feebly that green lights are not needed. The lesson for statesmen and 
historians is the same: informal empires rely on political markets rather than 
administrative codes. Searching for responsible officials and unambiguous signals is 
often unproductive. 
Finally, our list excludes cases in which the U.S. government played a decisive 
role in overthrowing a government and actually managed to conceal its role. The 
number of such cases is probably small, though in the era before widespread leaking in 
Washington, i.e., prior to the Nixon era, there may yet be untold secrets. 
 
The list of 41 interventions in Table 1 is thus fairly conservative. Overthrowing 
governments in Latin America has never been exactly routine business for the United 
States, but the option to depose a sitting government has appeared on the desk of U.S. 
presidents with remarkable frequency over the past century.  
 
III 
Throughout the twentieth century, U.S. officials cited U.S. security interests 
either as determinative or as a principal motivation for nearly every intervention.9 Even 
in cases where U.S. officials did not acknowledge the U.S. role in the overthrow of a 
Latin American government until much later, they generally remarked on how much 
more friendly or reliable the new regime would be. In the numerous pre-World War 
One interventions in the Caribbean, especially the prolonged occupations of the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua, U.S. officials suggested they were worried at 
the prospect that a potentially (but not then actually) hostile power like Germany might 
secure coaling stations and other facilities that its fleet could then use as bases for 
attacking the United States. In the aftermath of World War Two, U.S. officials usually 
cited the potential security threat posed by Soviet “penetration” of the western 
hemisphere to justify interventions in the region.  
With hindsight, it is now possible to dismiss virtually all these claims as 
implausible on their face. Some of the alleged threats cited by U.S. officials were 
wonderfully imaginative. In December 1926 and January 1927, with the Christmas 
holidays to stimulate the imagination, U.S. officials and their friends in the print media 
                                                 
9 The principal exceptions to this rule were the 1990 invasion of Panama and the 1994 
intervention in Haiti.  
 
solemnly endorsed charges leveled by pro-U.S. Nicaraguan politicians to the effect that 
the Liberal revolt led by Cesar Augusto Sandino formed part of a Mexican-Soviet plot 
“to establish a Bolshevist wedge between [the] continental United States and the Panama 
Canal,” as the New York Times breathlessly reported.10 In January, Secretary of State 
Frank Kellogg, seeking to justify the dispatch of Marines to re-occupy Nicaragua, 
entitled his formal statement to a skeptical Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
“Bolshevist Aims and Policies in Latin America.”11 The Soviet leadership, which so far as 
is known had virtually no aims or policies toward Latin America, not even diplomatic 
relations with their Mexican co-conspirators, would have been surprised and delighted 
had any of Kellogg’s testimony proved to be true. The fact is that the United States has 
never faced a significant military threat from Latin America. Even in the most often cited 
case, that of Cuba in 1962, the Pentagon did not believe that the installation of Soviet 
missiles in Cuba had altered the global strategic balance of nuclear terror.12  
The Cuban case is especially fascinating because of the long debate over whether 
the Cuban leadership pulled the country into the Soviet bloc or was pushed to do so by 
evidence of U.S hostility. Even more interesting is the suggestion that the Soviets, whose 
                                                 
10 New York Times, “New Aspect Given Nicaragua Policy,” January 5, 1927, pp 1ff. 
11 The full text, 3328 words, of Kellogg’s imaginative statement was published on page 
two of the New York Times on January 13, 1927. 
12 Some retrospective ambiguity on this point has crept into many accounts of the 
October 1962 Missile Crisis, but the “Summary of Agreed Facts and Premises, Possible Courses of 
Action and Unanswered Questions,” prepared by Special Counsel to the President Theodore 
Sorensen after a series of initial meetings of the decision makers, including the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, is quite clear: “It is generally agreed that these missiles, even when fully operational, do not 
significantly alter the balance of power – i.e., they do not significantly increase the potential 
megatonnage capable of being unleashed on American soil, even after a surprise American 
nuclear strike. The Soviet purpose in making this move is not understood – whether it is for 
purposes of diversion, harassment, provocation or bargaining.” The text of Sorensen’s memo is in 
The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader edited by Laurence 
Change and Peter Kornbluh (New York: The New Press, 1992), 124-25 
 
foreign and defense policies often seemed rooted in nineteenth-century notions of 
spheres of influence, were prepared to abstain from aiding and protecting Cuba in 
exchange for some indication of U.S. willingness to resolve differences over the status of 
Berlin or refrain from deploying obsolete nuclear missiles in Turkey. How else is one to 
interpret Nikita Khrushchev’s comments to John F. Kennedy at their first meeting in 
Vienna in June 1961? The U.S. government’s summary of their conversation on June 3 
has Khrushchev saying,13 
As to Fidel Castro, he was no Communist but when the U.S. put pressure on him 
and applied sanctions against him, the USSR came to his assistance, in the form 
of trade and technical support. Under the influence of this aid he may turn 
Communist, but Mr. Khrushchev said, he as a Communist could not see which 
way Castro would go. Mr. Khrushchev then expressed the hope that the relations 
between the US and Cuba would improve in such fields as trade, etc. Such a 
statement, Mr. Khrushchev observed, might sound strange to the United States, 
but the USSR believes that such a development would improve relations not only 
in the Western Hemisphere, but also throughout the world. Mr. Khrushchev then 
referred to Turkey… 
 
Kennedy did not respond to Khrushchev’s remarks on Cuba. To the contrary, when he 
returned to the United States, he ordered U.S. forces to a higher state of readiness and 
mobilized National Guard units all over the country to signal U.S. “resolve” in the face 
of Khrushchev’s threats.14 In short, the U.S. government declined an opportunity to 
negotiate a reduction in Soviet aid to Cuba in order to avoid negotiating on other issues, 
confident that it could dispose of the irritating Cuban regime without making 
concessions elsewhere.  
                                                 
13 “Memorandum of conversation between President Kennedy and Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev at the Vienna Summit, June 3, 1961,” in Ibid., p. 13. 
14 The “threats” became a reality when the Soviets correctly interpreted Kennedy’s action 
as signaling a rejection of any flexibility on the status of Berlin or the division of Germany. The 
Berlin Wall went up in August, two months after the Vienna meeting. 
 
In some of our 41 cases, the claims that U.S. security required overthrowing 
governments in the region were made solely to generate public and congressional 
support, but not taken seriously by the key decision makers who made them.15  At other 
times, policymakers cited real threats elsewhere on the planet to explain actions in the 
western hemisphere that bore no relation to U.S. security, relying perhaps on the median 
voter’s notoriously shaky grasp of the earth’s physical and human geography.16 
In the few cases of U.S. hostility to other governments in which U.S. security was 
plausibly invoked, the threat cited was always a potential threat with a low probability of 
ever materializing. A good example is the case of Nicaragua in the 1980s. Reagan 
administration officials and supporters usually cited one or more of three implausible 
threats to justify arming the Contra terrorists based in Honduras. The first was a variety 
of domino theory, pushed especially by the Central Intelligence Agency briefers and the 
President’s Commission on Central America headed by former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger, according to which the political preferences of two million Nicaraguans might 
filter across three international borders, through jungles, and around mountains to 
persuade 80 million Mexicans to become implacable foes allied to the Soviet Union. 
Central America did not matter much, according to director of Central Intelligence 
William Casey, but Mexico was teetering on the brink.17  The two other commonly cited 
threats were the prospect that Soviet land-based missiles might be installed in Nicaragua 
                                                 
15 The invasion of Granada in 1983 fits well in this category. The White House devoted 
most of its time to celebrating the rescue of U.S. medical students, who did not feel threatened 
until the U.S. started shooting. 
16 This may help to explain the initial public tolerance of the proposition that serious 
threats were emanating from Central America in the 1980s; see below. 
17 The CIA’s senior Latin American analyst, John R. Horton, resigned in disgust after 
Casey repeatedly exaggerated threats to Mexico’s stability. New York Times, “Analyst Said to 
Have Quit CIA in Dispute,” by Philip Taubman, September 28, 1984.  
 
and the possibility that the Soviets could threaten the Panama Canal from Nicaragua. 
Neither of these “threats” caused any lost sleep at the Pentagon. Land-based missiles 
were already obsolete; Soviet submarines with multiple warhead missiles could lurk 
undetected much closer to U.S shores. And the Panama Canal had long since ceased to 
serve any useful military purpose because it is too narrow for U.S. aircraft carriers to fit 
through. (In fact, the U.S. has maintained a “two-ocean” navy ever since the canal 
opened.) None of the threats commonly cited by politicians and editorial writers were at 
all troubling to serious security analysts at the time. 
The only plausible threat that could have been posed by a potentially hostile 
Nicaragua to the security of the United States, arose from the possibility that the 
Nicaraguans might one day permit the Soviet Union to build air bases in their country 
from which Soviet aircraft could attack shipping in the Sea Lanes of Communication 
(SLOCs) that pass through the Caribbean to Western Europe.18  In the event of an all out 
Soviet conventional arms attack on Western Europe, argued security analyst Michael 
Desch, these SLOCs would be crucial to the U.S. effort to rush military supplies to 
NATO forces. To prevent Nicaragua-based Soviet aircraft from attacking ships in the 
Caribbean SLOCs, the United States would have to divert aircraft from the defense of 
Western Europe for the day or two it might take to destroy the Soviet bases. Assuming 
that the United States and its NATO allies did not wish to escalate the conflict by 
resorting to nuclear weapons, and that Soviet tank armies would sweep across the north 
German plain at breakneck speed, any delay in the arrival of even a small number of 
U.S. aircraft could result in the loss of Western Europe to Communist aggression. Thus, 
                                                 
18"Turning the Caribbean Flank: SLOC Vulnerability During a European War," Survival, 
29:6 (November/ December 1987): 528-551. 
 
the fate of Western Europe might well depend on the success of U.S. efforts to 
overthrow the government of Nicaragua. Though the Nicaraguan government 
repeatedly stated that it had no intention of ever permitting foreign military bases on its 
territory and said that it would be pleased to sign an international treaty to that effect, 
the government of the United States was not impressed by this trickery. 
It is unlikely that any significant military threat would ever have materialized if 
the 41 governments deposed by the United States between 1898 and 1994 had remained 
in office until voted out or overturned without U.S. help. This was even true in the 
1960s, when the United States helped to depose nine governments, most of them elected 
democratically -- about one every 13 months, more than in any other decade. We now 
know that U.S. decision makers were repeatedly assured by experts in the CIA and other 
intelligence gathering agencies that, in the words of a 1968 National Intelligence 
Estimate, “In no case do insurgencies pose a serious short run threat…revolution seems 
unlikely in most Latin American countries within the next few years.”19  
 
IV 
In both the United States and Latin America, economic interests are often seen as 
the underlying cause of U.S. interventions. This hypothesis has two variants. One cites 
corruption and the other blames capitalism. The corruption hypothesis contends that 
U.S. officials order interventions to protect U.S. corporations. The best evidence for this 
version comes from the decision to depose the elected government of Guatemala in 1954. 
Except for President Dwight Eisenhower, every significant decision maker in this case 
had a family, business or professional tie to the United Fruit Company, whose interests 
                                                 
19 FRUS, 1964-68, vol. 31, p. 170-71. 
 
were adversely affected by an agrarian reform and other policies of the incumbent 
government.20 Nonetheless, in this as in every other case involving U.S. corporate 
interests, the U.S. government would probably not have resorted to intervention in the 
absence of other concerns. As the Guatemalan Communist leader Manuel Fortuny put it, 
“They would have overthrown us even if we had grown no bananas.”21 
The capitalism hypothesis, or what Lars Schoultz calls “the drive to promote U.S. 
economic development,” is more sophisticated. It holds that the United States 
intervened not to save individual companies but to save the private enterprise system, 
thus benefiting all U.S. (and Latin American) private interests with a stake in the region. 
This is a more plausible argument, based on repeated declarations by U.S. officials, who 
seldom miss an opportunity to praise free enterprise. Capitalism was not at risk, 
however, in any of the U.S. interventions. In a number of cases, the U.S. intervention 
occurred against the backdrop of impending or actual economic crises that imperiled 
many private enterprises, but in most of these cases (Chile in 1973 or Nicaragua in the 
1980s, for example), the economic crises were in large part the result of deliberate U.S. 
policies aimed at making the incumbent regime unpopular and thus more vulnerable. In 
these cases, it was the U.S. decision to intervene that provoked the economic crisis, not 
the reverse.22  Moreover, the United States did not intervene to overthrow most 
                                                 
20 See, for example, Stephen Kinzer and Stephen Schlesinger, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the 
American Coup in Guatemala (Expanded edition, Cambridge: David Rockefeller Center for Latin 
American Studies, Harvard University, 1999). 
21 Quoted in Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United 
States, 1944-54 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 366. 
22 This is not meant to imply that the incumbent governments bore no responsibility for 
the economic crises they faced. It is important to note that in these two and other cases, however, 
U.S. policies played a significant role not only in contributing to external imbalances (by, inter 
alia, ending access to multilateral financing), but also in persuading opposition forces to confront 
 
governments that mismanaged their economic and fiscal affairs, not even in the 
Caribbean, where the United States has been overthrowing governments most 
frequently, often at little or no expense, since 1898. 
It is true, of course, that U.S. policymakers sought throughout the past century to 
promote U.S. trade and investment in Latin America. Latin American governments have 
generally viewed such economic ties in a positive light, though the major economies of 
the region adhered to protectionist tariff policies until the mid-1980s or later and in some 
periods regulated or taxed foreign direct investment in ways that discouraged new 
flows of capital. Only three of the 41 U.S. interventions appear to have involved disputes 
over trade policy or the treatment of U.S. investment, and even in these cases, these 
disputes were not cited by U.S. authorities as a cause of the U.S. intervention.23 
 
V 
The U.S. government’s proclaimed ideological (and occasionally practical) 
preference for democratic regimes does not help explain why the United States 
intervened in most cases. U.S. officials ordered interventions to overthrow elected 
governments (twelve of the 41 cases) more often than to restore democratic regimes in 
Latin America (six of the 41 cases). Thus, a preference for democracy also fails to carry 
much explanatory power.24 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
rather than compromise on fiscal issues, as in Chile, or to make sound fiscal policy impossible 
due to rising defense costs (Nicaragua).   
23 The three cases are Mexico (1913), Guatemala (1954), and Chile (1973). 
24 Some recent work suggests that foreign direct investment tends to prefer authoritarian 
regimes; see John P. Tuman and Craig F. Emmert, “The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Direct 
Investment in Latin America: A Reappraisal,” Latin American Research Review, 29.3 (2004): 9-28. 
 
VI 
An economist might approach the thorny questions of causality not by asking 
what consumers or investors say about their preferences, but what their actions can help 
us to infer about them. Supply side logic, for example, would suggest that interventions 
will occur more often where they do not cost much, either directly in terms of decision 
makers’ time and resources, or in terms of damage to significant interests. To put it 
another way, it should not be surprising to find that U.S. interventions have occurred 
most frequently where the direct costs of the intervention and the potential costs of 
failure have been lowest, as in the Caribbean and Central America. The classic case of a 
cheap intervention was the invasion of Granada in 1983. Secretary of State George 
Schultz barely mentioned it in his memoirs. Serious people had important matters to 
attend to. Schultz assigned Granada to his Deputy, Kenneth Dam, who adroitly 
deflected attention to the triumphant White House.25  
On the demand side, two factors seem to have been crucial in tipping decision 
makers toward intervention: global strategy and domestic politics. The United States in 
the 20th century defined its strategic interests in global terms. This was particularly true 
after World War II when the United States moved rapidly to project its power into 
regions of the earth on the periphery of the Communist states where it had never had a 
presence before. In the case of Latin America, where the United States faced no threat, 
policy planners did nonetheless find much to keep them busy. To project power into the 
strategically important regions of the planet, the U.S. had to demonstrate that it 
possessed the capacity and will to intervene in Latin America where no significant 
                                                 
25 See Eldon Kenworthy, “Grenada as Theater,”World Policy Journal, vol. 1 (Spring 1984): 
635-51; John A. Lent, “Mass media in Grenada : three lives in a decade,” Journalism Quarterly, vol. 
62 (Winter 1985): 755-62. 
 
strategic or economic interests were threatened. This meant that the United States could 
not afford to tolerate governments that failed to conform to U.S. policy preferences, even 
when the consequences of their deviations affected no significant U.S. interest. The 
problem with credibility as a guide to policymaking is that it unhinged U.S. policy aims 
from the discipline imposed by the calculated pursuit of recognizable U.S. interests.26 
Predictably, U.S. policy in Latin America, especially in the Caribbean where 
interventions were relatively cheap, came to be linked to the vagaries of U.S domestic 
politics. A good example of the dominance of domestic politics over good policymaking 
is the decision taken by President Lyndon Johnson to order U.S. troops to the Dominican 
Republic in 1965. It now seems clear that he did so not because of any plausible threat to 
the United States, or even to the Dominican Republic. The threat he feared was much 
closer – the Republicans in Congress who were waiting to criticize him for failing to 
prevent “another Cuba.”27  Political competition within the United States accounts for 
the disposition of many U.S. presidents to order interventions, including most notably 
President Reagan’s obsession with Central America, which was not shared by any of the 
more experienced and capable officials in his administration, and the first President 
Bush’s preoccupation with General Noriega in Panama.  
                                                 
26 A variant of the credibility conundrum is that doctrine of strategic denial, that is, the 
argument that the United States had to control of certain areas of the globe, including entire 
continents, to deny potential enemies access to raw materials, logistical support, or intangible 
assets, such as political or diplomatic support. For an unusually plausible statement of this view, 
see Michael C. Desch, When the Third World Matters: Latin America and United States Grand Strategy 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,1993). 
27 See, for example, Eric Thomas Chester, Rag-Tags, Scum, Riff-Raff and Commies: The U.S. 
Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001). 
 
 
In a region where intervention was not very costly, and even major failures 
unlikely to damage U.S. interests, the lack of discipline encouraged by credibility 
concerns often led U.S. administrations to allow domestic political competition to 
overwhelm other considerations in making decisions that resulted in violent changes of 
government and regime in twentieth-century Latin America. 
 
VII 
 The political and ideological preferences that guided U.S. governments in 
intervening in Latin America were more conservative than those of either the U.S. or 
Latin American citizenry. This gap became most acute during the Cold War era. For 
over 40 years, from 1948-49 to the early 1990s, the US used its immense power and 
resources to ensure that Latin Americans had governments more conservative (and thus 
reliably anti-Communist) than Latin American voters were willing to elect or that U.S. 
citizens would have tolerated at home. The human cost of this effort was immense. 
Between 1960, by which time the Soviets had dismantled Stalin’s gulags, and the Soviet 
collapse in 1990, the number of political prisoners, torture victims, and executions of 
non-violent political dissenters in Latin America vastly exceeded that of the Soviet 
Union and its East European satellites. 
As the democratic regimes that were restored in the 1980s and early 1990s have 
consolidated, and Latin American voters have become more confident that they will last, 
they have begun redressing the imbalances inherited from the Cold War era. The 
region’s persistent inequalities, which undermine economic growth, elevate poverty 
rates, and aggravate political and social instability, may now be addressed with the 
greater urgency they demand. It would serve the long term U.S. economic interests as 
 
well as the official U.S. ideological preference for stable democratic regimes, if the 
United States were able to avoid repeating the past century’s promiscuous and 
undisciplined interventionism.   
 
 
SELECTED US INTERVENTIONS, 1898-1994 
 
U.S. Direct Interventions Military/CIA activity that changed governments 
Country Year Event Summary 
Cuba 1898-1902 Spanish-American War 
 1906-09 US ousts elected Pres. Palma; occupation regime 
 1917-23 US reoccupation, gradual withdrawal 
Dominican Rep 1916-24 U.S. occupation 
 1961 Assassination of Pres. Trujillo 
 1965 U.S. Armed Forces occupy Sto Domingo 
Grenada 1983 U.S. Armed Forces occupy island; oust government 
Guatemala 1954 C.I.A.-organized armed force ousts Pres. Arbenz 
Haiti 1915-34 U.S. occupation 
 1994 U.S. troops restore constitutional government  
Mexico 1914 Veracuz occupied; US allows rebels to buy arms 
Nicaragua 1910 Troops to Corinto, Bluefields during revolt 
 1912-25 U.S. occupation 
 1926-33 U.S. occupation 
 1981-90 Contra war; then support for opposition in election 
Panama 1903-14 U.S. Troops secure protectorate, canal 
 1989 U.S. Armed Forces occupy nation 
   
US Indirect Interventions:  Government/regime changes in which US is decisive 
Country Year Event Summary 
Bolivia 1964 Military coup ousts elected Pres. Paz Estenssoro 
 1971 Military coup ousts Gen. Torres 
Brazil 1964 Military coup ousts elected Pres. Goulart 
Chile 1973 Coup ousts elected Pres. Allende. 
 1988-89 Aid to anti-Pinochet opposition 
Cuba 1933 U.S. abandons support for Pres. Machado 
 1934 U.S. sponsors coup by Col. Batista to oust Pres. Grau 
Dominican Rep. 1914 U.S. secures ouster of Gen. José Bordas 
 1963 Coup ousts elected  Pres. Bosch 
El Salvador 1961 Coup ousts reformist civil-military junta 
 1979 Coup ousts Gen. Humberto Romero 
 1980 U.S. creates and aids new Christian Demo junta 
Guatemala 1963 U.S. supports coup vs. elected Pres. Ydígoras  
 1982 U.S. supports coup vs. Gen. Lucas Garcia 
 1983 U.S. supports coup vs. Gen. Rios Montt 
Guyana 1953 CIA aids strikes; government is ousted  
Honduras 1963 Military coup ousts elected Pres. Villeda Morales 
Mexico 1913 U.S. Amb. H. L. Wilson organizes coup vs. Madero 
Nicaragua 1909 Support for rebels vs. Zelaya government 
 1979 U.S. pressures  Pres. Somoza to leave 
Panama 1941 US supports coup ousting elected Pres. Arias   
 1949 US supports coup ousting constitutional government of VP Chanís 
 1969 U.S.supports coup by Gen. Torrijos 
 
